Georgia State University Law Review
Volume 36
Issue 2 Winter 2019-2020

Article 1

1-1-2020

Cryptocurrency Meets Bankruptcy Law: A Call for Creditor Status
for Investors in Initial Coin Offerings
Miriam Albert
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University, miriam.r.albert@hofstra.edu

J. Scott Colesanti
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University, j.s.colesanti@hofstra.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Miriam Albert & J. Scott Colesanti, Cryptocurrency Meets Bankruptcy Law: A Call for Creditor Status for
Investors in Initial Coin Offerings, 36 GA. ST. U. L. REV. (2020).
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Georgia State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more
information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.

Albert and Colesanti: Cryptocurrency Meets Bankruptcy Law: A Call for Creditor Status f

CRYPTOCURRENCY MEETS BANKRUPTCY
LAW: A CALL FOR CREDITOR STATUS FOR
INVESTORS IN INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS
Miriam R. Albert & J. Scott Colesanti*
ABSTRACT
In 1973, experts Homer Kripke and John J. Slain published a
seminal study titled The Interface Between Securities Regulation and
Bankruptcy—Allocating the Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance
between Securityholders and the Issuer’s Creditors. That lengthy
analysis, contributed by, respectively, a former Securities and
Exchange Commission official and a professor of law, examined the
status quo and concluded that investors were receiving unfair priority
vis-à-vis creditors in bankruptcy proceedings administered under the
federal Bankruptcy Code. Focusing on the traditional “absolute
priority rule,” the study pointed out that the Securities and Exchange
Commission support for the investor priority was unfounded and
urged deference to the notion of general creditors coming first.
Since then, a host of developments complicated both the analysis
and the traditional view of Kripke and Slain. First, the pivotal
determination of “rescinding shareholder” has been made complex
by, among other things, an expanded notion of “sophisticated
investor” occasioned by phenomena such as “crowdfunding.”
Second, stock swaps, hedges, repurchase agreements, and other
hybrid responses to financier discomfort have clouded the definition
of “investor.” Finally, the explosive growth of cryptocurrencies (and
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University; Emory University, J.D./M.B.A.; New York University School of Law, LL.M. Professor
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have taught Business Law courses at the law school level for over 40 years. They would like to thank
Hofstra students Sarah Moller, Class of 2021 and Michael Guzowski, Class of 2020 for their assistance
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the ventures that would sell, distribute, trade, or package them)
highlighted the need for a new, softer line between creditor and
investor.
Accordingly, the present authors revisit the absolute priority rule
with a view towards historic SEC involvement with bankruptcy law
and contemporary classification of some cryptocurrency-related
entities as securities issuers. The article concludes that in light of the
existing provisions and interpretations, the “absolute priority rule”
examined through the lens of today’s innovative securities should be
rethought to give investors in initial coin offerings creditor status.
Whether the reader agrees or not is likely subordinated to the need
for a conversation on the most egalitarian response—under both the
securities laws and the Bankruptcy Code—to the investor’s claim for
in pari passu treatment normally reserved for creditors, and likewise
the general creditors’ opposition to sharing a legally enforceable
priority.
INTRODUCTION
A. Crypto Among Us
In March 2019, close to $200 million worth of cryptocurrency was
lost when the owner of a cryptocurrency trading platform died in sole
possession of its digital key.1 The debacle foisted the trading
platform into court protection, prompting calls for national legislation
by the Canadian Securities Administrators.2
Indeed, such security problems are not unexpected. At year-end
2017, the meteoric rise of the price of Bitcoin (e.g., $17,900) posed a
regulatory challenge to courts and government agencies alike.3
1. Kristine Owram, Canada Moves to Regulate Crypto Trading Amid Quadriga Scandal,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 14, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-0314/canada-moves-to-regulate-crypto-trading-amid-quadriga-scandal [https://perma.cc/VRE8-B5UF].
2. Id. (noting that “[c]rypto assets with a value of almost $1 billion were stolen in 2018 from
platforms around the world”).
3. Jemima Kelly, Bitcoin Hits New Record High as Warnings Grow Louder, REUTERS (Aug. 27,
2019, 11:13 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-markets-bitcoin/bitcoin-hits-new-recordhigh-as-warnings-grow-louder-idUSKBN1E919T [https://perma.cc/PG4L-2BN8]; see Rakesh Sharma,
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Moreover, the first and largest Bitcoin exchange, Mt. Gox, remains
protected by Japanese bankruptcy laws.4 These regulatory challenges
are rife with difficulties, often chief among them the battle for
prioritized status between creditors and depositors–investors—if such
are even identifiable as distinct classes.5
A spinoff of the volatile, virtual investment craze arrived in recent
years in the form of initial coin offerings (ICOs).6 In such ventures,
fledgling companies with grandiose plans exchange future “tokens”

Bitcoin Has a Regulation Problem, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 27, 2019, 11:19 AM),
https://www.investopedia.com/news/bitcoin-has-regulation-problem/ [https://perma.cc/R57T-EHPE].
4. See Tim Allman, MtGox Bitcoin Exchange Files for Bankruptcy, BBC (Mar. 1, 2014),
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/business-26394986/mtgox-bitcoin-exchange-files-for-bankruptcy
[https://perma.cc/5YZB-PBYX]. As of March 2019, a class action against the Mt. Gox owner and a
third-party bank remains on the docket for the Northern District of Illinois. Fourth Amended Class
Action Complaint at 1, Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 206 F. Supp. 3d 1362 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (No. 1:14cv-01437). That action—effectively stayed by the Japanese bankruptcy action—alleges, among other
things, conversion, consumer fraud, and negligence. Id. at 21; see infra Section III.A. for a discussion of
the Mt. Gox debacle.
5. See, e.g., NATHANIEL POPPER, D IGITAL G OLD : BITCOIN AND THE I NSIDE STORY OF THE
MISFITS AND MILLIONAIRES TRYING TO REINVENT MONEY 317 (2015) (“An academic study in
2013 had found that 45% of the Bitcoin exchanges that had taken money had gone under, several taking
the money of their customers with them.”); David Meyer, After Bitcoin Spike, Mt. Gox Creditors Want
to Yank the Failed Exchange Out of Bankruptcy, FORTUNE (Dec. 13, 2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/12/13/bitcoin-mtgox-bankruptcy-creditors/ [https://perma.cc/93M3-ZGK9].
6. Jake Frankenfeld, Initial Coin Offering (ICO), INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 4, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/initial-coin-offering-ico.asp
[https://perma.cc/A97L-ATG7].
Virtual currency has been defined as:
[A] digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and functions as: (1) a
medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a store of value, but
does not have legal tender status (i.e., when tendered to a creditor, is a valid and legal
offer of payment) in any jurisdiction. It is not issued or guaranteed by any
jurisdiction, and fulfil[l]s the above functions only by agreement within the
community of users of the virtual currency. Virtual currency is distinguished from fiat
currency (a.k.a. “real currency,” “real money,” or “national currency”), which is the
coin and paper money of a country that is designated as its legal tender; circulates;
and is customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in the issuing country.
It is distinct from e-money, which is a digital representation of fiat currency used to
electronically transfer value denominated in fiat currency.
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES—KEY DEFINITIONS AND POTENTIAL AML/CFT
RISKS 4 (June 2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-keydefinitions-and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B7J-U342]. For purposes of this article,
cryptocurrency and ICOs are equated as digital assets. A newer variation, the exchange traded fund
investing in such assets, already comes closer to regulation, as is evidenced by related filings for
registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission. See Nikhilesh De, Bitwise Files for New
ETF with SEC, COINDESK (Jan. 10, 2019, 3:26 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/bitwise-plans-newbitcoin-etf-with-nyse-arca [https://perma.cc/K9X8-GG3N].
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in a unique digital enterprise for investment.7 These enterprises state
plausible cases for securities law coverage, particularly in light of the
great many federal court holdings urging expansion of the securities
laws in favor of investor protection.8 For example, a company
promising partial ownership of a purely cyberspace enterprise may
accord digital tokens on a pro rata scale tied to the level of
investment. Such tokens only carry value in the accompanying
“blockchain” (i.e., digital ledger created by the enterprise).9
Compounding the regulatory challenge are the myriad definitional
hesitancies: the United States (U.S.) Department of the Treasury has
not declared Bitcoin or similar creations the equivalent of fiat
currencies, instead simply insisting that cash exchanges for
cryptocurrencies satisfy currency transaction requirements.10 The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) formally identified Bitcoin as
“property,” gains on which must be taxed like all other gains on
properties.11 And via a 2015 disciplinary decision, the U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) proclaimed
Bitcoin a “commodity,” thus making the instrument subject to
regulations promulgated under the Commodity Futures
7. Jason P.W. Halperin & David Siegal, Fraud in Cryptocurrency, and How the SEC Is Applying
6, 2019, 2:30
PM),
Federal Securities Laws to
Stop
It, LAW.COM (Mar.
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/03/06/fraud-in-cryptocurrency-and-how-the-sec-isapplying-federal-securities-laws-to-stop-it/?slreturn=20190803093320 [https://perma.cc/5PT8-M77U].
8. See, e.g., SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 395 (2004).
“Congress’ purpose in enacting the securities laws was to regulate investments, in
whatever form they are made and by whatever name they are called.” To that end, it
enacted a broad definition of “security,” sufficient “to encompass virtually any
instruments that might be sold as an investment.”
Id. (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990)).
9. Jean Bacon et al., Blockchain Demystified: A Technical and Legal Introduction to Distributed
and Centralised Ledgers, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2018).
10. See Press Release, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, FinCEN Issues
Guidance on Virtual Currencies and Regulatory Responsibilities (Mar. 18, 2013),
https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-issues-guidance-virtual-currencies-and-regulatoryresponsibilities [https://perma.cc/M2YY-MANX].
11. See Kevin Drawbaugh & Patrick Temple-West, Bitcoins Are Property, Not Currency, IRS Says
Regarding Taxes, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2014, 2:37 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitcoinirs/bitcoins-are-property-not-currency-irs-says-regarding-taxes-idUSBREA2O1LR20140325
[https://perma.cc/9KCN-9ETE]. The article also related that the IRS statement clarified that “virtual
currency is not to be treated as legal-tender currency to determine if a transaction causes a foreign
currency gain or loss under U.S. tax law.” Id.
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Modernization Act of 2000.12 The U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) acknowledged the CFTC classification in
December 2017; however, there still has been overlapping
jurisdiction, as the SEC has taken repeated disciplinary actions
against companies determined to invest in Bitcoin or other forms of
cryptocurrency for misleading disclosures to shareholders.13
However, relatively unaddressed is the issue of classifying a Bitcoin
investment (or any other cryptocurrency) for purposes of the federal
securities laws enacted over seventy-five years before the advent of
virtual and cryptocurrencies.
B. Brief History of the Federal Securities Laws
The federal securities laws of 1933 and 1934 were a drastic
reaction to the Wall Street folly that almost bankrupted the nation.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Congress were eager to restore
investor confidence and reacted to profligate speculation by creating
remedial laws with expansive reach.14 The purpose of these laws was
to provide investor protection through mandatory disclosure and anti12. Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity Exchange
Act Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions, In re TeraExchange LLC, CFTC No. 15-33,
2015
WL
5658082
(Sept.
4,
2015),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleadi
ng/enfteraexchangeorder92415.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3QY-8EBB].
13. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
14. Promptly after his inauguration, President Roosevelt began to push for securities reform, based
on the idea that disclosing adequate information to investors would lessen or eliminate the specter of
fraud. The idea was not to have the federal government sign off on the soundness of any particular
investment, but rather to require issuers to provide investors with necessary and material information
upon which to make investment decisions. In his message to Congress on March 29, 1933, President
Roosevelt said:
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any action which
might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are
sound in the sense that their value will be maintained or that the properties which they
represent will earn profit. There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every
issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full
publicity and information, and that no essentially important element attending the
issue shall be concealed from the buying public.
H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933). As has been noted, even before President Roosevelt worked to repeal
Prohibition and reward voters with a drink of alcohol, he worked to revamp the oversight of the stock
exchanges. See J. SCOTT COLESANTI, FAIRNESS, I NC .: THE O RIGINS ( AND BILLION -D OLLAR
BONUSES) OF RULE 10 B -5 AS A MERICA ’ S INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITION 4 (2018).
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fraud provisions.15 The first of these laws, the Securities Act of 1933
(1933 Act), is known as the “truth in securities” law and has two
primary goals: to make sure investors have material information
about possible investments and to prevent fraud in the purchase and
sale of securities.16 Neither the 1933 Act nor the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (1934 Act) was intended to provide a broad federal
remedy for all fraud.17 Instead, these statutes apply only to those
investments that are within their broad statutory definition of
“security.”18 Courts often reference a need for flexibility in applying
the definition of security.19
Cognizant of the remedial goals of the 1933 Act, Congress tried to
craft a broad definition that would “meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on
the promise of profits.”20 Thus, Congress included (but failed to
define) in the list of kinds of securities the catchall phrase
15. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). According to the Supreme Court, the
statutory purpose of the securities laws is “compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of
‘the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a
security.’” Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 11 (1933)); see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (holding that the primary purpose of the federal securities laws is to
“substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor”). Moreover, “[o]ne of
[the 1934 Act’s] central purposes is to protect investors through the requirement of full disclosure by
issuers of securities . . . .” Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). Thus, the design of the
statute was to “protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to
informed investment decisions.” SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) (citing A.C. Frost
& Co. v. Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 40 (1941)). “[T]he Court repeatedly has described
the ‘fundamental purpose’ of the Act as implementing a ‘philosophy of full disclosure . . . .’” Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1977) (quoting Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 186).
16. See Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 124 n.10.
17. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982); see also Northland Capital Corp. v.
Silver, 735 F.2d 1421, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 775 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c (2018). Both statutes provide a laundry list of categories and
examples of “securities,” including “any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security,’” to
sweep in the varied types of instruments Congress predicted would (or should) fall within the term.
§§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(10).
19. See, e.g., SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2004), aff’d, 408
F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[f]irst and foremost, the federal securities laws were drafted and
have consistently been interpreted from the perspective that flexibility in the law’s applicability is
paramount”).
20. Id. at 1341 (quoting Howey, 328 U.S. at 299). “Congress’ purpose in enacting the securities laws
was to regulate investments, in whatever form they are made and by whatever name they are
called.” Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990).
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“investment contract” to give the courts flexibility in interpreting this
important and far-reaching definition.21 The U.S. Supreme Court
availed itself of that flexibility, aggrandizing jurisdiction in crafting a
case law test that has come to be known as the “Howey test.”22 The
resulting common law standard (like so much of securities law)
results in case-by-case determinations of the threshold question to
any dispute.23

21. Reves, 494 U.S. at 64. “Throughout the history of struggling for an appropriate definition, courts
have been mindful of the fact that the bottom-line question is whether the particular investment or
instrument involved is one that needs or demands the investor protection of the federal (or state)
securities laws.” THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 30–31 (3d ed. 1996).
22. Howey, 328 U.S. at 293 (1946). The first U.S. Supreme Court case to interpret the definition of
investment contract in the 1933 Act was SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). Joiner
involved the offer and sale of assignments in oil leases, coupled with the promoter’s promise to drill test
wells. Joiner, 320 U.S. 345–46. The Court, in finding such offers to constitute investment contracts,
adopted a broad reading of the term investment contract. Id. at 351. In determining whether a given
investment was an investment contract, the Joiner court looked to “what character the instrument is
given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements
held out to the prospect.” Id. at 352–53. Three years later, the Court refined the definition of investment
contract in the seminal case of SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946). In Howey, the Supreme Court
held that if “a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from
the efforts of the promoter or a third party,” the investment scheme is an investment contract for
purposes of the Securities Act. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. The Howey definition of investment contract
“permits the fulfillment of the statutory purpose of compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the
issuance of ‘the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept
of a security.’” Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 11 (1933)). Additional support for this idea comes
from Tcherepnin v. Knight, where the Court stated that “[i]n searching for the meaning and scope of the
word ‘security’ in the Act, form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on
economic reality.” 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (citing Howey, 328 U.S. at 298). The Court’s statement in
Howey has been refined in the last half-century, with little substantive change, into the test used by
courts today to determine whether an investment scheme is a security for purposes of the Securities Act.
“After half a century, Howey still states the test for determining the existence of an investment contract.
In the intervening years, litigation has not focused on the correctness of the test, but rather on the precise
meaning of one or more of its parts.” LARRY D. SODERQUIST, SECURITIES REGULATION § 5:2.2, at 5-4
(3d ed. 1994). For a more detailed history of the Howey test, see Miriam R. Albert, The Howey Test
Turns 64: Are the Courts Grading This Test on a Curve?, 2 WM . & MARY BUS. L. REV . 1 (2011).
23. The lack of a statutory definition creates opportunities as well as limitations:
Conceptually, the lack of a statutory definition provides an opportunity for progress
on both the disclosure and anti-fraud fronts. Courts have the flexibility to bring within
the reach of the securities laws those interests that would not otherwise constitute
securities, but nonetheless are the kind of investments that trigger a need for investor
protection through mandatory, accurate disclosure. This flexibility also creates the
opportunity for inconsistent or unsound interpretations of the definition, potentially
triggering instability for the investing public.
Albert, supra note 22, at 11.
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Conversely, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the Code), adopted in its
current form in 1978, contains statutory definitions of a much more
definite character. Section 101(49) largely mirrors the securities law
legislative definition, though § 1145 expressly exempts certain
arrangements from those set categories (e.g., “note”).24 The Code
focuses on much more conventional securities products; moreover, a
lack of certainty in discharging the debtor is the chief ill to be
avoided.25
I. Statutory and Common Law Approaches to Defining a Security
A. The Securities Act of 1933
From its inception, § 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act contained a veritable
laundry list of arrangements that arise under American securities
laws. In its current form, the statutory definition of security reads as
follows:
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock,
security future, security-based swap, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateraltrust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security,
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities
(including any interest therein or based on the value
thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to
foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a “security[,]” or any certificate of
24. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(49), 1145 (2018).
25. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2018).
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interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate
for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.26
None of these examples expressly touch on bankruptcy estate assets.
Of the definition’s myriad possibilities, the SEC seized upon
investment contract as a catchall, as explained below.27
B. The Howey Test
Although the SEC has rarely shied from an opportunity to expand
its jurisdiction,28 the investing public can remain calm because any
overreaching by the SEC would arguably be tempered by the modest
remedy sought of registration under § 5 of the 1933 Act.29 A primary
means of such expansion by the SEC is via an ever-expanding notion
of an investment contract, a term included but not defined in the
seminal securities laws.30 From 1946 through the present, a common
26. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018).
27. J. Scott Colesanti, Trotting Out the White Horse: How the SEC Can Handle Bitcoin’s Threat to
American Investors, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV . 1, 37 (2014).
28. In its effort to further investor protection, the SEC has maintained, with varying degrees of
success, that the concept of investment contract includes many financial schemes not specifically
mentioned by the federal securities laws, thereby honoring the Supreme Court’s instruction that, “in
searching for the meaning and scope of the word ‘security’ . . . form should be disregarded for substance
and the emphasis should be on economic reality.” Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
29. Colesanti, supra note 27, at 37.
[A]rmed with a broad definition, incalculable judicial support, and a mandate from
the investing public, the SEC has used section 5 of the 1933 Act to exercise
jurisdiction over arrangements far removed from those securities traded on stock
exchanges, and to counter faddish investment frenzies centering on, among others,
farm cooperative notes, condominiums, and collateralized debt obligations (including
those of the synthetic genre). Even when a jurisdiction has seemingly closed the door
on SEC jurisdiction, facts often surface permitting the case to proceed.
Id. at 37–38 (citations omitted).
30. The lack of a statutory definition creates opportunities as well as limitations:
Conceptually, the lack of a statutory definition provides an opportunity for progress
on both the disclosure and anti-fraud fronts. Courts have the flexibility to bring within
the reach of the securities laws those interests that would not otherwise constitute
securities, but nonetheless are the kind of investments that trigger a need for investor
protection through mandatory, accurate disclosure. This flexibility also creates the
opportunity for inconsistent or unsound interpretations of the definition, potentially
triggering instability for the investing public.
Albert, supra note 22, at 11. Further, one commentator explained:
The term was included in the definitional section of the Federal Securities Act of

Published by Reading Room, 2020

9

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 1

242

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:2

law test has been employed in justifying the actions of an agency
formed in 1934 to combat Wall Street fraudsters, successfully
reaching Ponzi schemers, foreign defendants, and novel forms of
enterprise such as viatical settlements.31 And in recent years, this
intentionally flexible common law test has been applied to the robust
number of innovative financing schemes in the area of digital
currencies.32
1. The Howey Test Before Cryptocurrencies
The Howey test fleshes out what constitutes an investment contract
for purposes of the federal securities laws.33 The term had no
standard meaning in any commercial context, although it appeared in
several states’ blue sky laws before the 1933 Act.34 The test seeks to
identify transactions in which investors are relying on others to
manage the enterprise that will produce financial returns on their

1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b, as well as many state securities laws for a particular reason:
the drafters of these statutes realized that, at one point in time, they could not predict
all the various investment products the ingenuity of participants in the securities
business could concoct. In effect then, the term investment contract can be analogized
to an expansion joint as it provides flexibility and adds a universal quality to the
definition of investment security. This is especially true in the federal domain, and in
particular, the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. It was because the
courts imposed an expansive construction of federal securities law that a definition
evolved for the term investment contract. For, standing alone, the term would be
meaningless.
Willis H. Riccio, The Ubiquitous Investment Contract, 56 R.I. B.J. 15, 15 (2007).
31. See generally Miriam Albert, The Future of Death Futures: Why Viatical Settlements Must Be
Classified as Securities, 19 PACE L. REV . 345 (1990).
32. NASAA Expands Annual Top Investor Threat List, NORTH AM. SEC. ADMINS. ASS’N (Oct. 13,
2013),
http://www.nasaa.org/27012/nasaa-expands-annual-top-investor-threats-list/
[https://perma.cc/XYJ9-N5T5] (explaining the North American Securities Administrators Association
expanded its “Annual Top Investor Threat” list to include digital currencies in 2013); see Colesanti,
supra note 27, at 37–38 for a discussion of Bitcoin and its multiple sources and uses.
33. Colesanti, supra note 27, at 27–28 (“[T]he Howey decision of 1946 began a ceaseless period of
brashly applying the Securities Acts to nonconventional securities—an ever-growing list of investments
the First Circuit has coined ‘a kaleidoscopic assortment of pecuniary arrangements that defy
categorization.’ This expansive reading of the statute is buttressed by court decisions noting the lack of
other regulatory remedies—the Supreme Court has even expressly tilted the scales in favor of finding a
security when the instruments in question ‘would escape federal regulation entirely if the [Securities]
Acts were held not to apply.’”) (citations omitted).
34. See GARY M. BROWN, SECURITIES LAW AND PRACTICE DESKBOOK § 5:2.2, at 5-3 (6th ed.
2012).
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investments.35 These investors are deemed to be more vulnerable
without the disclosure that would come from registration under the
federal securities laws than investors who are participating in the
management of the enterprise. Under Howey, any interest that
“involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with
profits to come solely from the efforts of others” is an investment
contract,36 thereby included within the definition of security and
subject to the rules and regulations of the federal securities laws.37
The Supreme Court’s definition of investment contract in Howey is
intentionally flexible,38 and thus consistent with the congressional
approach to defining the broader concept of what constitutes a
security.39 Although the Court has said that when analyzing whether
an investment opportunity is a security, “form should be disregarded
for substance”40 and the emphasis should be on “the economic
realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended
thereto,”41 the choice of a flexible definition has led “to complex and
fact-intensive judicial inquiries in the application” of the test,
allowing for inconsistent results across “courts engaging in such
inquiries, creating the possibility of similarly-situated litigants
winding up with dissimilar outcomes.”42
The Howey test is typically described as having four prongs.43 The
first prong requires an investment of money.44 Courts have held that
cash is not the only form of contribution or investment that will
35. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).
36. Id.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018).
38. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. This definition embodies a “flexible rather than a static principle, one
that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the
use of the money of others on the promise of profits.” Id. The test “permits the fulfillment of the
statutory purpose of compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of ‘the many types of
instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.’” Id.
39. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847–48 (1975).
40. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
41. United Hous. Found., 421 U.S. at 849.
42. See Albert, supra note 22, at 8–9, 11, 16–19 for a discussion of the specter of inconsistent
interpretation or application by the lower courts threatening to undermine the utility of the Howey test
itself as a trigger for investor protection.
43. See, e.g., Albert, supra note 22, at 15.
44. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
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satisfy this prong.45 This prong has been interpreted to include cash,
promissory notes,46 and bartered-for goods and services.47 The
investment of money element is met when an investor parts with
consideration with the hope of some future return.48 And as one
commentator aptly noted, “It appears that any nuanced reading of the
first element is subsumed in subsequent [t]est factors.”49
The second prong requires that the investment of money be in a
common enterprise.50 The Supreme Court in Howey made a showing
of fact to support a finding of commonality but failed to define the
contours of this required commonality, leaving it to the lower courts
to flesh out.51 Two tests have developed to satisfy the requirement of
commonality. First, this prong can be satisfied in some circuits
through “horizontal commonality,” which focuses on the connection
between and among the investors (i.e., looking for investors sharing
the risk of the enterprise by sharing profits and losses
proportionately).52 The alternate approach taken by some circuits is
known as “vertical commonality,” focusing on the connection
between the promoter and investors and looking to see if “the
fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the

45. Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 574 (10th Cir. 1991).
46. Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432–33 (9th Cir. 1976).
47. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560–61 (1979). But see United States v. Jones,
450 F.2d 523, 525 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding airline ticket vouchers were not securities due to purposes set
out in 18 U.S.C. § 2311 on the prohibition against carriage of forged instruments, even where such
provision—which largely echoed the 1933 Act and 1934 Act definitional sections—specifically
included “evidence of indebtedness”).
48. See BROWN, supra note 34, § 5:2.2A, at 5-5.
49. Colesanti, supra note 27, at 32.
50. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
51. Christopher L. Borsani, A “Common” Problem: Examining the Need for Common Ground in the
“Common Enterprise” Element of the Howey Test, 10 D UQ . BUS. L.J. 1, 4 (2008); see also Jonathan E.
Shook, Note, The Common Enterprise Test: Getting Horizontal or Going Vertical in Wals v. Fox Hills
Development Corp., 30 TULSA L. REV. 727, 732–33 (1995) (citing Shawn Hill Crook, Comment, What
is a Common Enterprise? Horizontal and Vertical Commonality in an Investment Contract Analysis, 19
CUMB. L. REV. 323, 325 (1989) (“Unfortunately, because neither the Court in Howey nor any
subsequent Supreme Court decision has defined the ‘common enterprise’ prong of the Howey test, the
federal courts have been left to disagree.”)).
52. Albert, supra note 22, at 16–17.
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efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third
parties.”53
The third prong requires that the investment be undertaken with
the expectation of profits.54 This expectation cannot be of additional
contributions, and the return on investment must be the principal
motivation for the investment.55 This prong is often “synonymous
with the marketing of the financial arrangement[s]” particular to the
given investment and is often demonstrated by a promoter’s “wistful
statements or advertising of successful commercial activities.”56
The fourth prong requires the expectation of profits to be from the
efforts of others.57 Recall the goal of the federal securities laws is to
provide investor protection through mandatory disclosure and antifraud regulations. Here, the passive investor is in much greater need
of these protections than an investor involved in running the
investment.58 This prong has seen significant movement since Howey
was decided. The original language in Howey required that the
investment of money in this common enterprise be undertaken with
the expectation of profits solely from the efforts of others.59 The
limitations inherent in prohibiting the expectation of profits by the
investor would exclude any investment that involved even the most
minimal effort from the investors from the protection of the securities
53. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973); Colesanti, supra
note 27, at 33–34 (“[V]ertical commonality was juridically divided into strict and broad varieties,
enthusiastically embraced by litigants and opportunistically utilized by the SEC. ‘Strict’ vertical
commonality requires that the economic fates of the Promoter and Investor be tied and that their
fortunes rise and fall together; the focus rests upon a closely-aligned ‘one-to-one relationship between
the investor and investment manager.’ Conversely, ‘broad’ vertical commonality requires only that the
‘efforts’ of Promoter and Investor be ‘linked.’ The Supreme Court has not determined which, if any, of
the versions is universally required.”).
54. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
55. Albert, supra note 22, at 19. Many courts combine the third and fourth components, and thus
refer to the test as a three-part test. See, e.g., Warfield v. Alaniz, 569 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir.
2009) (citing SEC v. Rubera, 350 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2003)) (“We distilled Howey’s definition into a
three-part test . . . .”); SEC v. Life Partners, 87 F.3d. 536, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1997). This combination is
supportable, as the full idea is that the investor has an expectation of profit and that expectation must
come, to a large measure, from the efforts of someone other than the investor.
56. Colesanti, supra note 27, at 34–35.
57. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
58. See Albert, supra note 22, at 12.
59. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
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laws—arguably defeating the goals of the securities laws
themselves.60 The Supreme Court began to walk back the “solely”
language in United Housing Foundation v. Forman, with its
comment that the “touchstone is the presence of an investment in a
common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to
be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.”61
The Howey test, for better or for worse, is what courts and
investors are left with to determine whether a given opportunity is an
investment contract and thus within the reach of the federal securities
laws, specifically the registration and prospectus delivery
requirements of § 5. As Professor Colesanti previously noted:
Overall, despite some hiccups, Howey transformed the
1933 Act and 1934 Act into dynamic statutes that would
forever value the dual promises of section 5 (i.e.,
registration and prospectus delivery). Moreover, the federal
bench has continued to uphold Howey’s promise of
protection for [i]nvestors in securities traditional or
otherwise; such continued protection is laudable for, among
other reasons, the vulnerability and political nature of
agency-made law in general.62
2. The SEC’s Response to Cryptocurrencies
The SEC has not been shy about using the Howey test to attempt to
rein in “the countless and variable schemes devised by those who
seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits.”63 The
world of cryptocurrency is fertile ground for SEC intervention.
Commentators have debated whether and how cryptocurrencies
60. Robinson v. Glynn, 349 F.3d 166, 170 (4th Cir. 2003).
61. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
62. Colesanti, supra note 27 (citing THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION
328–29 (2d. ed. 2006); then citing WILLIAM F. FOX, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 54–57
(6th ed. 2012)) (noting that the federal agencies’ “administrator[s are] totally subject to Presidential
control”).
63. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
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should be regulated, with the debate clearly illustrating that any path
to regulation was not self-evident from the language of the 1933 and
1934 Acts.64 Under certain circumstances, the SEC has declared that
both vehicles purchasing cryptocurrency and ICOs themselves
constitute sales of securities warranting formal registration with the
agency (and related public disclosures).65 The first relevant holding
was in 2013.66
a. SEC v. Shavers
One of the SEC’s earliest actions in this area was SEC v. Shavers,
in which the SEC delved into whether a fund designed to trade
Bitcoin constituted an investment contract under Howey, specifically
finding that the use of Bitcoin satisfied the first prong of the Howey
test.67 Trendon Shavers, the founder and operator of Bitcoin Savings
and Trust (BTCST), solicited lenders to invest in Bitcoin-related
opportunities,68 and “[t]he SEC assert[ed] that Shavers made a
number of misrepresentations to investors . . . and . . . defrauded
investors.”69 Shavers challenged the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction, arguing that the BTCST investments are not securities
because Bitcoin is not “money.”70
64. See generally Colesanti, supra note 27 (calling for more active SEC regulation of Bitcoin). For a
broader, generalized call for regulatory action, see Ruoke Yang, When Is Bitcoin A Security Under U.S.
Securities Laws?, 18 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 99, 114–15 (2013) (concluding that Bitcoin itself satisfies all
prongs of the Howey test).
65. See, e.g., Order Instituting Cease-And-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 8A of the
Securities Act of 1933, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order at 8, Munchee Inc.,
Securities Act Release No. 10445, 118 SEC Docket 975 (Dec. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Munchee Order].
66. SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013).
67. SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 WL 12622292, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2014) (order
granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion for reconsideration). Bitcoin was such a new
phenomenon that the court needed to find a viable definition and description. This led to one ground for
appeal by Mr. Shavers, who argued that the court had improperly relied “upon a second-year law
student’s law review article.” Id. The court notes that it did rely on the article by Derek A. Dion, I’ll
Glady Trade You Two Bits on Tuesday for a Byte Today: Bitcoin, Regulating Fraud in the E-Conomy of
Hacker-Cash, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 165, 167 (2013), but only for a definition and
description of Bitcoin. Id.
68. Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182, at *1.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Unsurprisingly, the SEC disagreed and argued “that the BTCST
investments are both investment contracts and notes, and thus, are
securities.”71 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
agreed, finding that the BTCST investments were in fact investments
of money because Bitcoin could be used as money to purchase goods
and services and could be exchanged for “conventional” currencies.72
Accordingly, the court found that “Bitcoin is a currency or form of
money, and investors wishing to invest in BTCST provided an
investment of money.”73
Next, the court applied the Fifth Circuit’s vertical commonality
test requiring “interdependence between the investors and the
promotor” and found that the investors were dependent on Shavers’s
expertise in Bitcoin markets and his local connections.74 Finally, the
court found that any investors participating in the BTCST
investments were expecting profits from Shavers’s efforts.75
Accordingly, the investments sold by Shavers were deemed
investment contracts and thus securities.76
b. The DAO Report
Whether cryptocurrencies are investment contracts and thus
securities is the subject of an SEC release entitled “Report of
Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934: The DAO” (the DAO Report).77 The DAO Report
reiterates the fundamental principles of the federal securities laws
71. Id.
72. Id. at *2.
73. Id.
74. Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2.
75. Id. The court noted that “Shavers began advertising that he was in the business of ‘selling
Bitcoin to a group of local people’ and offered investors up to 1% interest daily ‘until either you
withdraw the funds or my local dealings dry up and I can no longer be profitable.’” Id. at *1. The court
found this sufficient to demonstrate an expectation of profits from his efforts. Id. at *2.
76. Id. at *2.
77. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The
DAO at 1, Exchange Act Release No. 81207, 117 SEC Docket 745 (July 25, 2017) [hereinafter DAO
Report]. “The DAO is one example of a Decentralized Autonomous Organization, which is a term used
to describe a ‘virtual’ organization embodied in computer code and executed on a distributed ledger or
blockchain.” Id. at 1.
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and “describes their applicability to a new paradigm—virtual
organizations or capital raising entities that use distributed ledger or
blockchain technology to facilitate capital raising and/or investment
and the related offer and sale of securities.”78 The DAO Report
concludes that DAO Tokens are in fact securities, and so the SEC
provides typical cautionary language stressing issuers’ obligations to
comply with the federal securities laws:79
The Commission is aware that virtual organizations and
associated individuals and entities increasingly are using
distributed ledger technology to offer and sell instruments
such as DAO Tokens to raise capital. These offers and sales
have been referred to, among other things, as “Initial Coin
Offerings” or “Token Sales.” Accordingly, the Commission
deems it appropriate and in the public interest to issue this
Report in order to stress that the U.S. federal securities law
may apply to various activities, including distributed ledger
technology, depending on the particular facts and
circumstances, without regard to the form of the
organization or technology used to effectuate a particular
offer or sale.80
In the DAO Report, the SEC, although deciding against
enforcement action, declared that Slock.it, a German cyberspace
corporation holding “a corpus of assets through the sale of DAO
Tokens to investors,” had sold securities under American securities
laws.81 In less than one month during the spring of 2016, Slock.it
sold over 1 billion DAO Tokens.82 The SEC did not bring an
enforcement action against Slock.it because a hacker stole
78. Id. at 2.
79. Id. at 3.
80. Id. at 10.
81. See generally id.
82. DAO Report, supra note 77, at 5. The DAO’s intended purpose was to “blaze a new path in
business for the betterment of its members, existing simultaneously nowhere and everywhere and
operating solely with the steadfast iron will of unstoppable code.” Id.
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approximately one-third of the DAO’s assets after the DAO Tokens
were sold but before the DAO was able to begin financing the
project.83
In applying the Howey test to DAO Tokens, the SEC first
concluded that the investors in DAO Tokens did invest money,
although no traditional currency changed hands.84 Money would
typically connote currency, but the case law supports the idea that
cash is not the only form of contribution or investment needed for the
finding of an investment contract.85 The SEC found that DAO
Tokens investors used Ether (ETH), a virtual currency used on a
decentralized platform that runs smart contracts, known as the
Ethereum Blockchain, to make their investments.86 Each investor
tendered ETH in exchange for DAO Tokens. Despite the lack of
traditional currency to satisfy Howey’s “investment of money” prong,
the SEC concluded that the investment in DAO Tokens “is the type
of contribution of value that can create an investment contract under
Howey.”87
The SEC combined discussion of the commonality prong of the
Howey test with the DAO Tokens in its discussion of the “reasonable
expectation of profits” prong of the Howey test.88 The only reference
to the commonality requirement is the SEC’s unsupported conclusion
that DAO Token investors were investing in a common enterprise.89
The SEC devoted more analysis to the expectation of profits prong

83. Id. at 1.
84. Id. at 11.
85. Id. (citing Uselton v. Comm. Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 574 (10th Cir. 1991)
(citations omitted)); see also Munchee Order, supra note 65. (“Munchee offered and sold MUN tokens
in a general solicitation that included potential investors in the United States. Investors paid Ether or
Bitcoin to purchase their MUN tokens. Such investment is the type of contribution of value that can
create an investment contract.”). See supra Section II.B.2.a. for a discussion of SEC v. Shavers.
86. DAO Report, supra note 77, at 11.
87. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 574 (“[T]he ‘investment’ may take the form of ‘goods and services,’ or
some other ‘exchange of value.’”); DAO Report, supra note 77, at 11 (citing SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13CV-416, 2014 WL 12622292, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2014) (order granting in part and denying in
part defendants’ motion for reconsideration) (finding that an investment of Bitcoin, a virtual currency,
meets the first prong of Howey)).
88. DAO Report, supra note 77, at 11.
89. Id.
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and noted that for purposes of the Howey test, profits can include
“dividends, other periodic payments, or the increased value of the
investment.”90 The DAO was a for-profit enterprise with the stated
objective to fund projects in exchange for a return on investment.91
Because DAO Token holders had the possibility of sharing in
potential profits from the various contracts funded, the SEC
concluded that “a reasonable investor would have been motivated, at
least in part, by the prospects of profits on their investment of ETH in
[t]he DAO.”92
The final prong of the Howey test—that the profits be derived
primarily from the managerial efforts of others—was met with DAO
Tokens because the investors “relied on the managerial and
entrepreneurial efforts of Slock.it, its co-founders, and [t]he DAO’s
Curators, to manage [t]he DAO and put forth project proposals that
could generate profits for [t]he DAO’s investors.”93
The SEC made it clear that the federal securities laws apply to any
and all investments that fall within the statutory definition of
security:
The registration requirements are designed to provide
investors with procedural protections and material
information necessary to make informed investment
decisions. These requirements apply to those who offer and
sell securities in the United States, regardless whether the
issuing entity is a traditional company or a decentralized
autonomous organization, regardless whether those
securities are purchased using U.S. dollars or virtual
currencies, and regardless whether they are distributed in
certificated form or through distributed ledger
90. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394 (2004).
91. DAO Report, supra note 77, at 11–12.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 12. The SEC was not troubled by the DAO Token holders’ voting rights, finding that these
rights “did not provide them with meaningful control over the enterprise because (1) DAO Token
holders’ ability to vote for contracts was a largely perfunctory one; and (2) DAO Token holders were
widely dispersed and limited in their ability to communicate with one another.” Id. at 14.
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technology.94
This SEC’s clear precedent became an injunction action not much
later.
c. The Munchee Stop Order
In 2017, the SEC halted an entrepreneurial offering commenced by
Munchee Inc.95 Munchee, a California corporation, issued digital
coins to budding restaurant critics for submitting a review of a local
eatery.96 The SEC halted the offering on day two of its operation,
which had been slated to earn $15 million from American
purchasers.97 As the accompanying SEC settlement order stated:
Under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act, a security
includes “an investment contract.” An investment contract
is an investment of money in a common enterprise with a
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. [] The
“touchstone” of an investment contract “is the presence of
an investment in a common venture premised on a
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.” [] This
definition embodies a “flexible rather than a static
principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the
countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek
the use of the money of others on the promise of profits.”98
An “initial coin offering” or “ICO” is a recently developed
form of fundraising event in which an entity offers
participants a unique digital “coin” or “token” in exchange
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 18.
Munchee Order, supra note 65, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
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for consideration (most commonly Bitcoin, Ether, or fiat
currency). The tokens are issued and distributed on a
“blockchain” or cryptographically-secured ledger. Tokens
often are also listed and traded on online platforms,
typically called virtual currency exchanges, and they
usually trade for other digital assets or fiat currencies.
Often, tokens are listed and tradeable immediately after
they are issued.99
That same month, the SEC Chair issued a warning to all potential
ICO issuers that the securities laws would presumably apply to their
deals:
A key question for all ICO market participants: “Is the coin
or token a security?” As securities law practitioners know
well, the answer depends on the facts. For example, a token
that represents a participation interest in a book-of-themonth club may not implicate our securities laws, and may
well be an efficient way for the club’s operators to fund the
future acquisition of books and facilitate the distribution of
those books to token holders. In contrast, many token
offerings appear to have gone beyond this construct and are
more analogous to interests in a yet-to-be-built publishing
house with the authors, books[,] and distribution networks
all to come. It is especially troubling when the promoters of
these offerings emphasize the secondary market trading
potential of these tokens. Prospective purchasers are being
sold on the potential for tokens to increase in value—with
the ability to lock in those increases by reselling the tokens
on a secondary market —or to otherwise profit from the
tokens based on the efforts of others. These are key

99. Id. at 3 n.1.
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hallmarks of a security and a securities offering.100
The Chair’s warning to investment professionals concurrently
acknowledged a presumption that related parties would, where
appropriate, be subject to the securities laws:
I also caution market participants against promoting or
touting the offer and sale of coins without first determining
whether the securities laws apply to those actions. Selling
securities generally requires a license, and experience
shows that excessive touting in thinly traded and
volatile markets can be an indicator of “scalping,”
“pump and dump[,]” and other manipulations and
frauds. Similarly, I also caution those who operate systems
and platforms that effect or facilitate transactions in these
products that they may be operating unregistered exchanges
or broker–dealers that are in violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.101
To the extent the weight of the SEC’s vaunted Division of
Enforcement was not readily comprehended, the Chair continued:
On cryptocurrencies, I want to emphasize two points. First,
while there are cryptocurrencies that do not appear to be
securities, simply calling something a “currency” or a
currency-based product does not mean that it is not a
security. Before launching a cryptocurrency or a product
with its value tied to one or more cryptocurrencies, its
promoters must either (1) be able to demonstrate that the
currency or product is not a security or (2) comply with
applicable registration and other requirements under our

100. Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial
Coin Offerings (Dec. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Clayton Statement].
101. Id.
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securities laws.102
d. The Khaled and Mayweather Cases
Approximately a year after the Munchee Order and the Chair’s
warnings, the SEC made good on its advertised presumption that
coins issued via ICOs are securities.103 Significantly, in accepting
$900,000 to promote three ICOs on his Instagram, Twitter, and
Facebook accounts, champion boxer Floyd Mayweather was found to
have violated Section 17(b) of the Securities Act.104 In a
much-publicized settlement with the boxer, the SEC imposed
discipline upon Mayweather—an ordinary citizen, not a securities
professional—for his paid endorsement of digital tokens.105 That
SEC Order (Mayweather Order) tersely held, “Mayweather violated
Section 17(b) of the Securities Act by touting three ICOs that
involved the offer and sale of securities on his social media accounts
without disclosing that he received compensation from an issuer for
doing so, or the amount of the consideration.”106
The Mayweather Order did not explain the application of § 5 or the
Howey test to the ICOs in issue.107 The conclusion seems to be
presumed, as it was in a companion settlement Order concluded with
celebrity Khaled Mohamed Khaled, better known as DJ Khaled.108
Mayweather consented to pay $600,000 in satisfaction of a fine and

102. Id.
103. Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of
1933, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order at 2, Floyd Mayweather Jr., Securities
Act Release No. 10578, 2018 WL 6266203 (Nov. 29, 2018) [hereinafter Mayweather Order].
104. Id. at 2. The SEC continues to aggressively assert jurisdiction over digital transactions. On June
4, 2019, the SEC announced that it had sued Kik Interactive Inc. for its online sales of coins to the
public. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Issuer with Conducting $100
Million Unregistered ICO (June 4, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-87
[https://perma.cc/KXP8-4ZC3].
105. Mayweather Order, supra note 103, at 5.
106. Id. at 4.
107. See id.
108. See Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act
of 1933, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order at 3, Khaled Khaled, Securities Act
Release No. 10579, 2018 WL 626624 (Nov. 29, 2018) [hereinafter Khaled Order].
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disgorgement, as well as the undertaking to refrain from further
violations109 and Khaled agreed, for a two-year period, to:
[F]orgo receiving or agreeing to receive any form of
compensation or consideration, directly or indirectly, from
any issuer, underwriter, or dealer, for directly or indirectly
publishing, giving publicity to, or circulating any notice,
circular, advertisement, newspaper, article, letter,
investment service, or communication which, though not
purporting to offer a security, digital or otherwise, for sale,
describes such security.110
Thus, between 2017 and the present, the SEC, in word and deed,
expanded the scope of the securities laws to include ICOs. The SEC
now benefits from unchallenged agency support, precedent in the
form of SEC Orders, and a wealth of case law expanding application
of the Howey test for over seventy years.111 Such branding accords
the ICO depositor–investor, at first blush, an unsecured claim placed
a distant second to secured creditors. The next Section traces the
treatment of securities under the Bankruptcy Code through that
storied law’s various incarnations.112

109. Mayweather Order, supra note 103, at 4.
110. Khaled Order, supra note 108, at 3. Of note is the SEC No-Action Letter of early April 2019,
which permitted an ICO to move forward without registration of tokens representing air charter
discounts where the issuer, among other things, did not emphasize the “potential for the increase in the
market value of the Token” and the Token was limited to an immovable price of $1. See TurnKey Jet,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2019 WL 1471132 (Apr. 3, 2019).
111. See, e.g., SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 WL 12622292, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26,
2014) (order granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion for reconsideration); Khaled Order,
supra note 108, at 2, 4; DAO Report, supra note 77, at 18.
112. 11 U.S.C. § 101(49) (2018).
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C. The Bankruptcy Code On Securities and Section 510(b)
“Subordination”
1. Traditionally
In one sense, the contrast between the respective definitions of
security residing within securities and bankruptcy law tells a story of
statutory versus common law construction. However, the history
behind the Bankruptcy Code reveals that the SEC was never truly
distant from each generation’s notion of a level playing field for both
creditors and investors. It is axiomatic that bankruptcy reorganization
plans need to evaluate such practicalities as stock swaps, stock
registration, and anti-fraud laws. Such investments as real estate
partnerships, Bitcoin arrangements, LLCs, and commercial paper
holdings beg for certainty before a plan can be confirmed.
Significantly, congressional authority over bankruptcy proceedings
is more clearly defined by the U.S. Constitution than many of its
other powers.113 Specifically, Article I enables the federal legislature
to “establish uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout
the United States.”114 In the nineteenth century, three acts of
Congress alternatively granted and rescinded an individual’s right to
voluntary bankruptcy.115 The aim of marshaling property for
redistribution gradually succumbed to that of debtor relief—often
with strong opposition.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the first permanent federal
statute designed to provide American companies with relief from
creditors.116 That seminal legislation was centered on banks,
113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
115. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99;
Act of Aug. 9, 1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. 440, 441–42, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614;
Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 1-2, 2 Stat. 19, 20–22, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat.
248; see Vincent L. Leibell, Jr., The Chandler Act—Its Effect Upon the Law of Bankruptcy, 9 FORDHAM
L. REV . 380, 382–85 (1940).
116. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (Nelson Act), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549; see David A. Skeel Jr., The Genius of the 1898
Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR . D EV . J. 321, 326 (1999) (“Whereas the United States went long periods
without federal bankruptcy, England had national bankruptcy laws on the books throughout the
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merchants, and farmers.117 As one scholar explains, “In striking
contrast to the tough, administrative British framework that emerged
at the same time, American bankruptcy would have a minimalist
administrative structure and comparatively generous provisions for
the treatment and discharge of debtors.”118
2. The Chandler Act of 1938
In 1938, Congress, via the Chandler Act, tilted the balance even
more in favor of the debtor, as the Supreme Court memorialized in
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt:
One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to
“relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive
indebtedness[] and permit him to start afresh free from the
obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business
misfortunes.” This purpose of the act has been again and
again emphasized by the courts as being of public as well
as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but
unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the
property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt. The various provisions of the Bankruptcy Act
were adopted in the light of that view and are to be
construed when reasonably possible in harmony with it so
as to effectuate the general purpose and policy of the act.
Local rules subversive of that result cannot be accepted as
controlling the action of a federal court.119

nineteenth century.”).
117. Skeel, supra note 116, at 331–32.
118. Id. at 336.
119. Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244–45 (1934) (citations omitted).
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Concurrently, the Chandler Act prioritized customers over general
creditors in claims against a “single and separate fund.”120 Thus
Local Loan, a case deciding a $300 debt, would wind up impacting
billions of dollars.121
Since 2005, laws enacted and contemplated have targeted abuse by
the debtor.122 However, the interplay of securities law and the Code
remains a common law tangle.123
Interestingly, the SEC was accorded administrative authority over
bankruptcy filings by the 1938 Act.124 Separately, alarming
brokerage house failures of the late 1960s prompted Congress to
adopt the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA).125
Though seemingly extricating issues of investor status from the
Bankruptcy Code, SIPA actually only supplants the Code when a
registered brokerage firm becomes insolvent and its customers are
left with empty accounts (i.e., it does not affect depositor–investors
who have parted with money in favor of issuers, online or
otherwise).126

120. A Brief History of Bankruptcy, BANKRUPTCYDATA , https://www.bankruptcydata.com/a-historyof-bankruptcy [https://perma.cc/DBM3-7YFM] (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
121. See Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 238, 245; A Brief History of Bankruptcy, supra note 120.
122. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 1098, 119 Stat. 23; Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2017, H.R. Res. 1667, 115th Cong. § 2(e)
(2017).
123. Bankruptcy courts often show deference to the securities laws when evaluating investments
engaged in by debtors. See In re Flanagan, Nos. NV-13-1188-TaJuKi, NV-13-1189-TaJuKi, 2014 WL
764371, at *7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (applying the Howey test and finding “the bankruptcy
court did not err in determining that the Agreement was not an ‘investment contract’ for the purposes of
the Securities Act”); Williams v. Sato (In re Sato), 512 B.R. 241, 254 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2014) (applying
the Howey test and finding “the transaction between the parties constitutes an investment contract under
the federal test”); Estate of Adler v. SunTrust Bank, N.A. (In re American Capital Corp.), 425 B.R. 714,
722 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010) (applying the Howey test and finding “the guaranty fee notes attached to the
Amended Complaint in this case do not involve the investment of money by any of the insider Plaintiffs,
and thus are not ‘securities’ for purposes of the securities laws”).
124. Bankruptcy Act of 1938 (Chandler Act), Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 78lll (2018).
126. See id.
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3. The Modern Bankruptcy Code
The present Bankruptcy Code (Title 11) was adopted in 1978,127
with revisions to the appointment of Bankruptcy Court judges
codified in 1984.128 Its fifteen chapters (spread over four titles)
address, in turn, creditors, liquidation, reorganization, creditors, and
readjustment of debts.129 The Code specifically defines security in a
manner reminiscent of the 1933 Act:
a. Definitions
Definitions are positioned within Title 11. Security is defined as
follows:
The term “security”—(A) includes—(i) note; (ii) stock; (iii)
treasury stock; (iv) bond; (v) debenture; (vi) collateral trust
certificate; (vii) pre-organization certificate or subscription;
(viii) transferable share; (ix) voting-trust certificate; (x)
certificate of deposit; (xi) certificate of deposit for security;
(xii) investment contract or certificate of interest or
participation in a profit-sharing agreement or in an oil, gas,
or mineral royalty or lease, if such contract or interest is
required to be the subject of a registration statement filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, or is exempt under
section 3(b) of such Act from the requirement to file such a
statement; (xiii) interest of a limited partner in a limited
partnership; (xiv) other claim or interest commonly known
as “security”; and (xv) certificate of interest or participation
in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase or sell,

127. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–12 (2018).
128. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333.
129. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss2/1

28

Albert and Colesanti: Cryptocurrency Meets Bankruptcy Law: A Call for Creditor Status f

2020]

CRYPTOCURRENCY MEETS BANKRUPTCY LAW

261

a security . . . .130
Section 101(49) of the Code continues by expressly exempting a
list of instruments from the definition of security. That list includes
items that can be grouped into cash or its equivalents (e.g., a check,
bank letter of credit),131 special instruments defined elsewhere in the
Code (e.g., a “leverage transaction,” as defined in § 761),132 certain
transactions not subject to SEC registration requirements,133
commodities–derivatives,134 or a debt for sold goods or services.135
Conversely, the express exclusions are somewhat peculiar to the
Code. These exclusions include:
(i) [c]urrency, check, draft, bill of exchange, or bank letter
of credit; (ii) leverage transaction, as defined in section 761
of this title; (iii) commodity futures contract or forward
contract; (iv) option, warrant, or right to subscribe to or
purchase or sell a commodity futures contract; (v) option to
purchase or sell a commodity; (vi) contract or certificate of
a kind specified in subparagraph (A)(xii) of this paragraph
that is not required to be the subject of a registration
statement filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission and is not exempt under section 3(b) of the
Securities Act of 1933 from the requirement to file such a
statement; or (vii) debt or evidence of indebtedness for
goods sold and delivered or services rendered.136
Were it not for the overlapping jurisdiction between the SEC and
CFTC over virtual currency arrangements, the Code might thus

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
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exclude all claims related to ICOs as “commodities.”137 However, the
SEC has expressly preserved ICO jurisdiction, as explained above.138
Accordingly, the investor–depositor faces the real problem of
subordination under the Code, which is the subject of the next
section.139
b. Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code
In both a Chapter 11 reorganization and a Chapter 7 liquidation,
the shareholder of a corporation faces significant obstacles.140 In
brief, the owner of debtor securities takes action upon the debtor’s
filing for bankruptcy; at times, this action manifests itself as
“rescission” of unregistered securities.141 At other times, the
securities holder simply makes a claim, which is generally
subordinated to creditors of both the secured and unsecured type.142
Thus, in varied situations, the Code consistently relegates the
shareholder claim to a posterior position in the order of payout.143
Section 510(b) itself states as follows:
For the purpose of distribution under this title, a claim
arising from rescission of a purchase or sale of a security of
the debtor or of an affiliate of the debtor, for damages
137. See Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity
Exchange Act, Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions, In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 1529, 2015 WL 5535736 (Sept. 17, 2015). See generally Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable
Relief and for Civil Monetary Penalties Under the Commodity Exchange Act and Commission
Regulations, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, F. Supp. 3d 641 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)
(No. 18-CV-0361).
138. See supra Section II.B.2.
139. See infra Section II.C.3.b.
140. Bankruptcy: What Happens When Public Companies Go Bankrupt, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
(Jan.
19,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investorpublications/investorpubsbankrupthtm.html [https://perma.cc/K9SG-Y6JV].
141. See generally discussion infra Section II.C.
142. Chapter
11—Bankruptcy
Basics,
U.S.
CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/servicesforms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/F4R8-V8C3] (last
visited Oct. 20, 2019).
143. See Charles M. Tatelbaum, Shareholders Attain New Rights in Bankruptcy Proceedings,
OBSERVER (Feb. 22, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://observer.com/2017/02/court-of-appeals-ninth-circuitshareholder-bankruptcy-rights/ [https://perma.cc/F3HR-SEZQ].

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss2/1

30

Albert and Colesanti: Cryptocurrency Meets Bankruptcy Law: A Call for Creditor Status f

2020]

CRYPTOCURRENCY MEETS BANKRUPTCY LAW

263

arising from the purchase or sale of such a security, or for
reimbursement or contribution allowed under section
502 on account of such a claim, shall be subordinated to
all claims or interests that are senior to or equal the claim or
interest represented by such security, except that if
such security is common stock, such claim has the same
priority as common stock.144
Investors in a business that file for bankruptcy can see their infusions
dissipate or dry up before their claim is honored; conversely,
creditors stand a better chance of recovery.
Generally, the bankruptcy courts have ruled on the relation of
§ 510(b) to securities in various contexts—and in the presence of
various joined claims.145 The five cases summarized below provide
examples of the contexts in which debtors have sought to subordinate
claims in recent years.
(i) In re Lehman Bros. Inc.
In In re Lehman Bros. Inc.,146 the famed broker–dealer had been
placed into liquidation under SIPA, which created the Securities
Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC).147 The customer–claimant
subsequently brought an action premised upon Lehman’s alleged
failure to purchase Lehman Holding Company (LHI) bonds pursuant
to a prime brokerage account agreement.148 The initial ruling

144. 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (2018).
145. See infra Sections II.C.3.b(i–v).
146. In re Lehman Bros. Inc., 519 B.R. 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 808 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 2015).
147. JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, BARRON ’ S BUSINESS G UIDES : D ICTIONARY OF
FINANCE AND I NVESTMENT TERMS 672 (9th ed. 2014). SIPC, a nonprofit corporation, aims to parallel
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation by “insur[ing] the securities and cash in the customer
accounts of member brokerage firms against the failure of those firms.” Id. There are limits of,
respectively, $100,000 for cash or cash equivalents, and $500,000 per customer account. Id.
148. See
James
Chen,
Prime
Brokerage,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Sept.
2,
2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/primebrokerage.asp [http://perma.cc/LY25-EJB9]. Commencing
in the 1980s, “prime brokerage” reflects packaged services for clients with sophisticated investment
needs. Id.
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sustained an objection by the trustee seeking to subordinate claims
under § 510(b).149
The claimant’s appeal centered on three arguments. First, a literal
reading of § 510(b) should not apply in the absence of an actual
purchase or sale.150 Second, it was asserted that the claim for
damages should not be subordinated because it does not arise from
the purchase or sale of the LHI bonds within the meaning of
§ 510(b).151 Third, the claimant maintained that subordination of its
claim did not advance the statute’s purpose.152
Regarding statutory interpretation, the court reasoned that the
claim “[did] not require ‘arising from’ to be read nearly as broadly as
permitted under the [c]ase law.”153 Irrespective of the nature of the
claim, the statute “require[d] subordination of claims by security
holders that seek to recover, as [claimant] does, for the loss in value
of a security issued by the debtor or an affiliate.”154 Concurrently,
“[n]either Section 510(b) nor SIPA suggests an exception for
transactions involving broker–dealer debtors either purchasing or
selling affiliate bonds.”155
Further, pursuant to case law, the court found it well settled that
§ 510(b) applies even in the absence of an actual purchase or sale.156
The bench ruled that under Med Diversified157 and other case law, it
had been well settled that § 510(b) applies in the absence of an actual

149. In re Lehman Bros., 519 B.R. at 436.
150. Id. at 437.
151. Id. at 446.
152. Id. at 449.
153. Id. at 446.
154. Id.
155. In re Lehman Bros., 519 B.R. at 446.
156. Rombro v. Dufrayne (In re Med Diversified, Inc.), 461 F.3d 251, 252 (2d Cir. 2006). By
comparison, the application of famed SEC Rule 10b-5—the measure which is used to punish insider
trading and other securities fraud—often evaluates the actual purchase or sale of a security. See, e.g.,
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 724 (1975) (dismissing a claim by parties
dissuaded from purchasing the relevant securities). Such analysis is deemed mandated by the parting
words of the provision: “in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.” Id. But see SEC v.
Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 824 (2002) (finding a stockbroker liable for a Rule 10b-5 violation where
monies were filched but no clearly related securities transactions noted).
157. In re Med Diversified, Inc., 461 F.3d at 252.
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purchase or sale.158 “[G]iven ‘[t]he weight of precedent favoring
subordination’ even where no purchase or sale has occurred, ‘and the
absence of persuasive precedent upholding the contrary position, the
ambiguity vel non of the statutory text’” was held to be
inconsequential.159 Thus, the claim remained subordinated.
Finally, in evaluating policy considerations, the Lehman Bros.
court found that the “risk-allocation” rationale supported
subordination of the claim.160 Though the claimant argued that this
rationale did not apply because Lehman Brothers had agreed to pay a
fixed sum of cash for the LHI bonds, the court noted the key
distinction between case law and the present context: the fact that, in
contrast to Med Diversified161and other cases where the claimant
contracted to acquire more stock, the present claimant sought to
dispose of the LHI Bonds, thereby “terminating its right to share in
any appreciation in price.”162 In this vein, the court noted that the
claimant still held the LHI bonds as of the petition date, and its claim
was based in part on the diminished value of those bonds.163
This policy analysis is not uncommon. One leading practitioner
firm described the trend as such:
Many courts have decided cases under section 510(b) by
reviewing the traditional allocation of risk between a
company’s shareholders and its creditors. Under this
policy-based analysis, shareholders are deemed to expect
more risk in exchange for the potential to participate in the
profits of the company, whereas creditors can expect only
repayment of their fixed debts. Accordingly shareholders,
and not creditors, assume the risk of a wrongful or unlawful

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
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purchase or sale of securities . . . .164
(ii) Marro v. General Maritime Corp.
In 2014, the same year as Lehman Bros., the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York held that parties holding
$50,000 worth of “Senior Notes” issued by a debtor seeking Chapter
11 bankruptcy protection could not recover monies attributed to
principal and lost opportunities.165 Specifically, in Marro v. General
Maritime Corp., the court found § 510(b) inapplicable under the
reorganization plan, which called for the debtors to distribute cash,
equity, and warrants to the Senior Notes Indenture Trustee.166 Then,
noteholders would receive these distributions as full satisfaction of
their claims.167 Significantly, although the noteholder acknowledged
receiving his distribution from the Trustee, he filed an additional
proof of claim totaling $81,250–$50,000 for the principal amount of
the notes and $31,250 for opportunity costs and other damages,
which were attributed to fraudulent inducement, fraudulent retention,
breach of contract for the bond indenture, and breach of fiduciary
duty by the debtors.168
The court held that although not every breach of contract claim is
subject to mandatory subordination, the key is “whether the requisite
nexus is present to tie the specific claim at issue to the claimant’s
initial purchase of his securities.”169 Here, the noteholder himself
described his claim as “a hybrid of fraudulent inducement, fraudulent
retention[,] and breach of contract.”170 The court further held that on
164. Charles M. Oellermann & Mark G. Douglas, Mandatory Subordination Under Section 510(b)
Extends to Claims Arising from Purchase or Sale of Affiliate’s Securities, JONES DAY PUBLICATIONS
(Jones Day, New York, N.Y.), Mar./Apr. 2014, https://www.jonesday.com/Mandatory-SubordinationUnder-Section-510b-Extends-to-Claims-Arising-From-Purchase-or-Sale-of-Affiliates-Securities-03-312014/ [https://perma.cc/DY63-P58S].
165. Marro v. Gen. Mar. Corp. (In re Gen. Mar. Corp.), No. 13 Civ. 5019 (ER), 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 137488, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2014).
166. Id. at *2.
167. Id.
168. Id. at *2–3.
169. Id. at *10–11.
170. Id. at *11 (citation omitted).
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its face, § 510(b) applied to any such claim because fraudulent
inducement, by definition, describes misconduct occurring at the time
of a security’s purchase.171 The court then found that the remaining
theories of recovery—fraudulent retention, breach of fiduciary duty,
and breach of contract—pertained to the debtor’s post-acquisition
conduct. 172 However, under § 501(b) the outcome was the same.173
(iii) Templeton v. O’Cheskey
In 2015, the Fifth Circuit in Templeton v. O’Cheskey ruled that
unsecured claims of both the liquidated and unliquidated variety
should be subordinated.174 Templeton’s liquidated claim was
submitted for reimbursement, although its unliquidated claim
asserted fraud and breach of fiduciary duties in relation to those
investments.175 The debtor’s Trustee commenced an adversary
proceeding by filing a complaint that objected to Templeton’s
claim.176
Templeton invested in certain limited partnerships formed under
the guaranty of the debtor, American Housing Foundation (AHF),
who ultimately filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.177 Templeton
asserted claims based on the guaranties against AHF, arguing that its
claims should fall within “General Unsecured Claims”—for which
the estimated recovery fell between 20% and 40% of the claim
value.178 The Trustee argued instead that Templeton’s claims fell
within “Allowed Subordinated Claims”—a class with a 0% estimated
recovery.179 The decision was affirmed concerning the Trustee’s
suggested subordination.180 The court expressly held that “all of
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
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Templeton’s claims [were] claims ‘for damages arising from the
purchase or sale of’ a ‘security . . . of an affiliate of [AHF]’” and
must, therefore, be subordinated.181 In turn, the court described its
step-by-step analysis of this provision.182
First, regarding the unliquidated claims—fraud and breach of
fiduciary duties—Templeton sought damages based on the injuries
that resulted from these torts.183 Moreover, Templeton’s liquidated
claims, which sought reimbursement under AHF’s guaranties, also
constituted claims for damages.184 Although Templeton was suing for
the breach of the guaranties of limited partnership (LP) interests
(rather than for repayment of his equity investments in the LPs), such
proposed treatment was held to be exactly the “elevation of form
over substance that § 510(b) seeks to avoid—by subordinating claims
that functionally seek to ‘recover a portion of claimants’ equity
investments.’”185
By means of elaboration, the court found that Templeton’s claims
arose from the purchase of securities.186 To arise from the purchase
or sale of a security, the claim must have some causal relationship
with the sale. 187 Templeton itself clarified that the tort claims
stemmed directly from the LP investments.188 Furthermore, those LP
interests were securities of an affiliate189 of AHF as directly
referenced by the statute.190 The Bankruptcy Code defines “affiliate,”
in relevant part, as a “person whose business is operated under a
lease or operating agreement by a debtor, or person substantially all
of whose property is operated under an operating agreement with the

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 153.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 155.
In re Am. Hous. Found., 785 F.3d at 157.
Id. at 155 (citations omitted).
Id. at 155.
11 U.S.C. § 101(2)(c) (2018).
Id. § 510(b).
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debtor.”191 The Templeton court thus had little tolerance for creative,
alternative pleading in light of the plain language of the statute.
(iv) Murphy v. Madden
In 2016, the Sixth Circuit in Murphy v. Madden held that a
shareholder of Energy Conversion Devices (ECD) could not
effectively convert a securities claim to a novel tort action premised
upon a surprise bankruptcy filing.192 ECD and a related entity, United
Solar Ovonic LLC, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.193 Murphy
was a shareholder of ECD, holding 116,950 shares of ECD stock.194
The bankruptcy court authorized ECD’s liquidation sale through the
auction of nearly all of its assets.195 Murphy filed a claim for breach
of performance and violations of fiduciary responsibility to
shareholders.196 Because ECD’s actions in filing the petition and
subsequent liquidation sale substantially reduced the value of his
stock, Murphy claimed that he was owed $136,890, representing the
value of his shares of stock on the morning before the formal
commencing of the bankruptcy.197
The liquidation trustee concluded that Murphy merely had an
equity interest in EDC and that under § 510(b), his breach of
fiduciary duty claim still required subordination to the ECD’s
creditors’ claims.198 Murphy countered that the section did not apply
because his claim originated from his ownership of ECD stock rather
than from his actual purchase of the stock.199 Murphy argued that
judicial estoppel prohibited the application of § 510(b) to his claim
because ECD’s Bankruptcy Plan did not contemplate the section’s
191. Id. § 101(2)(c).
192. Murphy v. Madden (In re Energy Conversion Devices, Inc.), No. 15-1734, 2016 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4414, at *1–6, *9 (6th Cir. Feb. 19, 2016).
193. Id. at *1.
194. Id. at *2.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. In re Energy Conversion Devices, Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 4414, at *2.
198. Id. at *2–3.
199. Id. at *3–4 (emphasis added).
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application to noteholders who, like Murphy, merely owned ECD
securities. 200
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Trustee’s Order, concluding that
Murphy’s claim required subordination under § 510(b).201 The court
held that, for purposes of the section, there is no distinction between
fraud committed when the securities were purchased and fraud
committed after the purchase that adversely affects one’s ability to
sell those securities.202 Thus, the claim still arises from the purchase
or sale of such a security when an investor’s claim for damages is
caused by fraud either at the time of the purchase or post-purchase.203
The court further held that Murphy’s judicial estoppel argument was
misplaced because unlike Murphy, who merely held an equity
interest in ECD, the noteholders held debt interest in ECD.204
Accordingly, unlike Murphy’s equity interests, the noteholders were
unsecured creditors with claims against ECD not subject to
subordination under § 510(b).205
(v) Liquidating Trust Communication of the Del Biaggio
Liquidating Trust v. Freeman
Finally, the Ninth Circuit weighed in via Liquidating Trust
Communication of the Del Biaggio Liquidating Trust v. Freeman.206
In Liquidating Trust, “the entity charged with prosecuting claims
[during the] Del Biaggio’s bankruptcy” received an objection from
David Freeman, an investor in Predators Holdings, LLC.207 The case
has somewhat of a story behind it.

200. Id. at *4.
201. Id.
202. Id. at *4–5 (citations omitted).
203. In re Energy Conversion Devices, Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 4414, at *4–5.
204. Id. at *5.
205. Id.
206. Liquidating Tr. Commc’n of the Del Biaggio Liquidating Tr. v. Freeman (In re Del Biaggio),
834 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 2016).
207. Id. at 1006–07.
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The Nashville Predators are a National Hockey League team based
in Nashville, Tennessee that in 2007 was owned by Craig Leipold.208
In 2007, after David Freeman learned that Leipold intended to sell
the Predators to a third party who would move the team out of
Tennessee, Freeman began organizing a group of Nashville investors
to buy the team to avoid the potential move.209 Ultimately, Freeman
and his group of investors reached an agreement to purchase the
Predators from Leipold for $193 million.210 The sale of the Predators
to Freeman and his group of investors, including William Del
Biaggio III, closed on December 7, 2007.211 After the sale, Nashville
Hockey Club Limited wholly owned and operated the Predators.212 In
turn, Predators Holdings, LLC (Holdings) wholly owned the
Nashville Hockey Club Limited.213
After a few months, Freeman discovered that Del Biaggio never
had the necessary funds to support his guarantees.214 Del Biaggio
then filed for Chapter 11, giving rise the proceeding that ultimately
went before the Ninth Circuit with Freeman filing a general
unsecured claim against Del Biaggio’s bankruptcy estate seeking
damages from Del Biaggio’s fraud in the Holdings transaction.215 In
response, the Liquidating Trust Committee filed a counterclaim
against Freeman seeking summary judgment on the issues of
subordination and disallowance of Freeman’s claim based on
§ 510(b).216
Freeman lost, but on appeal he argued the bankruptcy court and
district court erred in applying § 510(b) to his claim against Del
Biaggio, contending his claim did not arise from the purchase or sale
of Holdings.217 Freeman further contended there was no privity
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
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because he purchased the Holdings securities from Leipold—not Del
Biaggio.218 Freeman also sought to avoid § 510(b)’s language by
arguing that even if its text pointed towards subordination, its
purposes did not.219
The circuit court denied all of Freeman’s objections.220 The Ninth
Circuit began by looking at the statute’s plain text, observing that
§ 510(b)’s “arising from” language reached broadly to subordinate
damage claims involving qualifying securities.221 Citing to a 2015
case, the bench held that:
The phrase “arising from” as employed in [the section]
“connotes, in ordinary usage, something broader than
causation” and is instead “ordinarily understood to mean
‘originating from,’ ‘having its origin in,’ ‘growing out of,’
or ‘flowing from’ or in short, ‘incident to, or having
connection with.’”222
Additionally, the court found it irrelevant that Freeman purchased the
securities from Leipold rather than from Del Biaggio.223 The court
reasoned that the statute only said a damages claim must arise from
the purchase of securities “of an affiliate of the debtor,” not from the
debtor himself.224 Accordingly, the lack of privity was irrelevant.
In general, the Freeman court reminded that there are “two main
rationales for mandatory subordination: (1) the dissimilar risk and
return expectations of shareholders and creditors; and (2) the reliance
of creditors on the equity cushion provided by shareholder
investment.”225 As he admitted, Freeman bargained for increased risk

218. In re Del Biaggio, 834 F.3d at 1010.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1009.
222. Id. at 1010 (citing Pensco Tr. Co. v. Tristar Esperanza Props., LLC (In re Tristar Esperanza
Props., LLC), 782 F.3d 492, 497 (9th Cir. 2015)).
223. Id.
224. In re Del Biaggio, 834 F.3d at 1010.
225. Id.
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in exchange for an expectation in the Holdings’s profits by investing
in an affiliate of Del Biaggio.226 However, Del Biaggio’s creditors
did not take this type of gamble 227 Thus, the court found that
allowing Freeman to stand on par with Del Biaggio’s creditor would
give Freeman the “best of both worlds—the right to share in profits if
[Holdings] succeeded and the right to repayment as a creditor [of Del
Biaggio] if it failed.”228
Indeed, the “best of both worlds” rationale appears to permeate the
case law of numerous circuits. To be sure, on various grounds in
various settings, courts evaluating a security’s § 510(b) status have
favored subordination.229 It is worth noting that all of the circuit court
decisions noted above were unanimous. 230 Interestingly, the emphasis
on the actual purchase or sale of securities—a common question in
securities cases231—is evidenced.
The bootstrapping of fraud claims to contractual claims has been
consistently frowned upon by bankruptcy courts.232 Further, a
bankruptcy court may unquestionably recharacterize a claim as
equity “within the Code’s confines.”233 Yet, the interface of securities
and bankruptcy law can rationally be characterized as a reflection of
the times facing investors. Indeed, the Kripke–Slain Hypothesis (the
Hypothesis)—although amplifying creditor expectations to be paid
before shareholders—nonetheless also posited that most claims arose
from fraudulent conversion at or near the time of sale.234

226. Id. at 1011.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1011–12.
230. In re Del Biaggio, 834 F.3d at 1011–12.
231. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 6.
232. See generally In re Lehman Bros., 503 B.R. 778 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (subordinating a claim
against a stockbroker for a failed trade), aff’d on other grounds, In re Lehman Bros. Inc., 519 B.R. 434
(S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 808 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 2015).
233. FCC v. Tel. & Data Sys., Inc (In re Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc.), 392 B.R. 392, 400 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 2008).
234. See generally John J. Slain & Homer Kripke, The Interface Between Securities Regulation and
Bankruptcy—Allocating the Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance Between Securityholders and the Issuer’s
Creditors, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 261 (1973).
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Because the ICO investor–depositor can now trust the SEC to have
prevented fraud ab initio (i.e., ICO warranting registration shall be so
required), a model based upon shareholder rescission seems a bit out
of date. Concomitantly, the recognition that fraud, if any, is more
likely to occur after the ICO takes place provides a clear point of
demarcation between speculation and expectation.
c. A Modern Trend?
Securities law has long been thought to be policy influenced.235
The question thus becomes, whether policy considerations will
unsettle Bankruptcy Code favoritism of debtors urging subordination
when frauds become more readily apparent and separated in time
from the initial purchase of stock. It is axiomatic that something more
than creditor negligence is required to warrant equitable
subordination under § 510(c)236 while statutory subordination is
undergoing a period of review. ICOs, with their billion-dollar
paydays and often inscrutable technical characteristics, can be said to
present a ripe opportunity for a re-evaluation of both § 510(b) and the
Hypothesis.

235. See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, A Question of Integrity:
Promoting Investor Confidence by Fighting Insider Trading (Feb. 27, 1998) (extolling the practicality of
the Supreme Court’s O’Hagan decision, which utilized a new SEC theory to expand the insider trading
ban to trading by corporate “outsiders”).
236. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) reads in toto as follows:
(c) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, after notice and a hearing,
the court may—
(1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of
distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another
allowed claim or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed
interest; or
(2) order that any lien securing such a subordinated claim be transferred to the
estate.
11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2018). The case requiring something exceeding creditor negligence is Crede v. Bank
of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 809 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2016).
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II. Is a New Protocol Warranted by the Advent of Mass Investment
in Digital Currencies?
In their 1973 article, The Interface Between Securities Regulation
and Bankruptcy—Allocating the Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance
between Securityholders and the Issuer’s Creditors, experts Homer
Kripke and John J. Slain examined the then-status-quo and concluded
that investors were receiving unfair priority vis-à-vis creditors in
bankruptcy proceedings administered under the federal Bankruptcy
Code.237 Focusing on the traditional “absolute priority rule,” the
study pointed out that the SEC support for the investor priority was
unfounded and urged deference to the notion of general creditors
coming first. 238 Messrs. Kripke and Slain were pointed in their 1973
observation that the absolute priority rule was being averted.239 Does
their rationale hold up in today’s complex markets?
A. The Mt. Gox Debacle
Mt. Gox was a Bitcoin exchange launched in 2010 based in
Japan.240 By 2014, Mt. Gox was the largest Bitcoin exchange in the
world, with over 70% of Bitcoin transactions.241 But all was not well
with Mt. Gox; starting in 2011, Mt. Gox had experienced a series of
hacks, totaling about 630,000 Bitcoin by 2013.242 In February 2014,
Mt. Gox halted all Bitcoin withdrawals.243 The former CEO of Mt.
Gox (who also owned approximately 88% of the failed exchange)
continues to face a class action in Illinois.244 That action was brought
237. Slain & Kripke, supra note 234, at 298–99.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Andrew Norry, The History of the Mt Gox Hack: Bitcoin’s Biggest Heist, BLOCKONOMI (June 7,
2019), https://blockonomi.com/mt-gox-hack/ [https://perma.cc/V3C2-LD66].
241. Id.
242. Liesl Eichholz, MtGox, BTC-e, and the Missing Coins: A Living Timeline of the Greatest Cyber
Crime Ever, BRAVE NEW COIN (Aug. 16, 2017, 4:42 PM), https://bravenewcoin.com/insights/mtgoxbtc-e-and-the-missing-coins-a-living-timeline-of-the-greatest-cyber-crime-ever [https://perma.cc/A3J7642X].
243. Id.
244. Brian Flood, Mt. Gox Chief Can’t Escape Suit over Crypto Exchange Collapse, BLOOMBERG L.
(Mar. 13, 2019, 1:04 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/class-action/mt-gox-chief-cant-escape-suit-
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by owners of Bitcoin who were abruptly informed that all
withdrawals were being halted for technical reasons, when in
actuality, hackers had purloined hundreds of millions of dollars’
worth of assets.245 In February 2014, Mt. Gox filed for bankruptcy
protection under Japanese law.246 The CEO was confined to the
island nation while under investigation for theft, a process that did
not resolve until March 2019.247
In the five years since the Mt. Gox disaster, the following
chronology has been revealed. The fledgling exchange, operating
under Japanese law, successfully solicited over $1 million of
Bitcoin.248 By 2013, allegedly, third-party banks were placing
pressure on the unique exchange to settle accounts out of fear of its
ties to money laundering.249 Consequentially, Mt. Gox users began to
experience difficulties in withdrawing their funds from Mt. Gox
accounts.250 Parties within and outside Mt. Gox were later alleged to
have wrongfully continued to accept deposits from new Bitcoin
purchasers, while behind the scenes operations were freezing up.251
When the Mt. Gox owner eventually shuttered the exchange and filed
for bankruptcy protection under Japanese law in February 2014,
liabilities were represented as exceeding $65 million, while the
forsaken Bitcoins were valued at over $400 million (allegedly due to
an unpreventable hacking).252
In June 2014, a Texas bankruptcy court recognized the primacy of
the Japanese bankruptcy proceeding and stayed all other litigation.253
over-crypto-exchange-collapse [https://perma.cc/J5N8-8ZWM].
245. Id.
246. Eichholz, supra note 242.
247. Flood, supra note 244.
248. Norry, supra note 240.
249. Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint at 7, Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 206 F. Supp. 3d
1362 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (No. 1:14-cv-01437).
250. Id. at 8.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 11.
253. Id. at 12. In March 2018, a company official stated that the company had sold off enough assets
to satisfy customer claims. Report from Nobuaki Kobayashi, Bankr. Tr., to Tokyo Dist. Court,
Collegiate
Section
of
20th
Civil
Div.
(Mar.
7,
2018),
https://www.mtgox.com/img/pdf/20180307_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FCG9-2ZLX]. A class action in
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Though the Mt. Gox example continues to be sorted out and,
incontrovertibly, visited irreparable woe upon creditor and investor–
depositor alike, the case stands out foremost as a notorious initial
chapter to the book of Bitcoin. The persisting domestic litigation
concerns the actions of individuals and not any bankruptcy estate;
truly, Mt. Gox is a curious tale of an exchange that either did or did
not ever exist, thus simply exponentially increasing the losses due to
a traditional shareholder rescission claim. Accordingly, to reevaluate
the rights of the cryptocurrency shareholder more meaningfully, a
court of repute was needed to upend traditional thought and refuse to
subordinate the claim of the cryptoshareholder, who invested in a
seemingly legitimate enterprise and was much later defrauded via
conventional human theft. A California case with disturbing facts
created such a chance in 2017.254
B. The Ninth Circuit Mini-Revolution in Khan
During the first decade of this century, as markets swung
volatilely, commentators followed in earnest the saga of
subordination.255 In one noteworthy case, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Texas subordinated over $2.7 million in debt
in a Chapter 11 battle between limited partners of a sea diving
company.256 Indeed, multiple circuits were said to subscribe to the
trend of finding congressional intent for a broad concept of
subordination of investments.257
However, a minor revolution occurred in 2017 within the Ninth
Circuit. In the Khan case, the appellate court, noting the dual
obstacles awaiting shareholders alleging fraud, severed the timeline

the United States continues. See, e.g., Pearce v. Karpeles, No. 18-306, 2019 WL 3409495 (E.D. Pa. July
26, 2019).
254. See Khan v. Barton (In re Khan), 846 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2017).
255. See Laurence May, Claimants Fight Subordination, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 29, 2009, at 1.
256. SeaQuest Diving, LP v. S & J Diving, Inc. (In re SeaQuest Diving, LP), 579 F.3d 411, 416 (5th
Cir. 2009).
257. May, supra note 255.
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between the purchase of securities and unexpected fraud occurring
later on.258
1. The Khan Decision
The Khan case, a play told in three parts, was described by the
highest court to hear the matter as “a saga of picaresque behavior.”259
In In re Khan, a Chapter 13 bankruptcy action was brought in a Ninth
Circuit Bankruptcy court.260 The bankruptcy court first converted a
Chapter 13 action to a Chapter 7 proceeding and then decided against
subordinating a creditor’s claims.261
The facts are as follows: in 2013, creditor Kenneth Barton
succeeded in obtaining a state court judgment against a corporate
debtor for conversion, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty.262 Barton
alleged that after he suffered a stroke in 2009 his cofounders
converted his approximately 6,000,000 shares of common stock of
the debtor (issued in 2001).263 The California Superior Court agreed
that the Debtors had “fraudulently converted Barton’s stock” by
means of “forged corporate resolutions.”264 Further, these parties had
“misplaced or destroyed” the records of shareholder ownership.265
The Superior Court, after additional hearings, awarded damages to
Barton of approximately $3.8 million.266
The Debtors quickly filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy; that petition
was converted to a Chapter 7 based upon a court finding of bad
faith.267 The bankruptcy court found that Barton’s claim was not
subject to subordination because it stemmed from the Superior Court
258. In re Khan, 846 F.3d at 1058, 1066; Charles M. Tatelbaum, Shareholders Attain New Rights in
Bankruptcy Proceedings, OBSERVER (Feb. 22, 2017), https://observer.com/2017/02/court-of-appealsninth-circuit-shareholder-bankruptcy-rights/ [https://perma.cc/SR85-6G9F].
259. In re Khan, 846 F.3d at 1066.
260. See generally id.
261. Id. at 1061.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. In re Khan, 846 F.3d at 1061.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1062.
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judgment.268 The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the
bankruptcy court ruling on simpler grounds: that § 510(b) cannot
apply to debtors who are individuals.269 Finally, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the refusal of the
lower courts to subordinate, noting that the judgment creating
Barton’s claim was based upon actions by the Debtors “many years
later” in relation to the initial issuance of the company stock.270
2. Khan and the SEC Actions Combined
Such a severed timeline spells relief for ICO investors who often
watch purchases of cryptocurrency later disappear due to hacking or
outright waste. And SEC action serves to bolster the shareholder
claim by separating the registration (i.e., § 5) violation from the fraud
(i.e., Rule 10b-5) violation, an approach evident in the Munchee
Order, Mayweather Order, and other disciplinary cases to date.271
In sum, the spate of SEC actions accord ICO purchasers investor
status, and the distinctions drawn between initial purchase and
subsequent fraud echo the Ninth Circuit’s attack on subordination.
According the investor–creditor status could greatly increase the
likelihood of salvaging a claim, thus making § 510(b)’s treatment of
shareholders a new and pivotal issue in many hotly contested
bankruptcy matters.272 That subordination issue was last addressed
nearly fifty years ago, and given the vast amounts of online
investments likely to be deemed securities, it is in dire need of
updating.

268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1063–64. The one Ninth Circuit case to cite Khan has not questioned its refusal to
subordinate a shareholder’s claim of conversion temporally removed from the investment. See Moore v.
Blue Earth, No. 17-cv-03905, 2018 WL 4378713, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2018) (noting that “Section
501(b)’s ‘arising from’ language ‘reaches broadly to subordinate damage claims involving qualifying
securities’ and ‘requires that claims be subordinated “where there exists some nexus or causal
relationship between the claim and the purchase of the securities”‘”) (citation omitted).
271. See supra Section II.B.2.
272. May, supra note 255, at 1–2.
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III. Elevated Status for Severable Crypto Investments
A. The Kripke–Slain Hypothetical
In their seminal article, the esteemed experts Kripke and Slain273
worked from the following example:
Assume that XYZ, Inc., having just been organized to
engage in the widget business, requires an additional
$300,000 of capital to start up. XYZ’s management, either
directly or through investment bankers, searches for a
group of substantial investors prepared to provide the
$300,000 and accept equity risks. They locate one such
investor, H, who has a personal investment portfolio of
several million dollars. Prior to his retirement, H was
employed as a portfolio manager for a financial business
and is concededly a “sophisticated investor.” H meets the
principals in XYZ . . . and purchases 30,000 shares of
XYZ’s common stock for $180,000. . . . Another 20,000
shares are sold for $120,000 to others less sophisticated,
who are impressed by the information that the sophisticated
Mr. H is participating.
XYZ begins operations and for six months after H’s stock
purchase conducts an active business. The corporation
quickly incurs $1,000,000 in liabilities to unsecured
lenders . . . . [One month later the corporation files for
bankruptcy.] In this proceeding, H asserts a claim for
rescission of his $180,000 stock purchase, alleging that the
issuer violated Section 5 of the Securities Act of
1933 . . . . XYZ’s trustee in bankruptcy attempts to show
that the issue was exempted as a nonpublic offering under
Section 4(2) of the Act, but fails when he is unable to
273. The authors each were enrolled in graduate law courses taught by Professor Slain (1927–2014), a
recognized expert in securities regulation.
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demonstrate that all the persons to whom the $300,000 in
stock had been offered were “sophisticated” . . . . [I]t is
probable that H has a claim . . . to share pari passu with the
claims of general creditors.274
B. A More Modern Hypothetical
The hypothetical offered by Messrs. Kripke and Slain spoke
strongly in support of the fairness of their interpretation. The
following updated hypothetical highlights the problem caused for
purchases of ICOs—either direct or indirect—by investors when the
intermediary goes bankrupt:
Assume that online issuer XYZ, Inc., having just created a
charter for a unique digital coin environment, requires an
additional $5 million of capital to start up. XYZ’s
management, either directly or through internet financiers,
offers coins to provide $5 million. They locate a wellheeled investor, H, who has a personal investment portfolio
numbering in the tens of millions of dollars.
Before his retirement, H was employed as a portfolio
manager for a financial business and is concededly a
“sophisticated investor.” He trades information online with
the principals in XYZ and purchases 3,000 coins for $2.8
million. Another 2,000 coins are sold for $1.2 million to
others less sophisticated, (I & J), who are impressed by the
information that the sophisticated Mr. H is participating.
XYZ begins operations and for six months after H’s coin
purchase conducts an active business. The corporation
quickly incurs $1,000,000 in liabilities to unsecured
lenders. Then, six months later, the company informs the
274. Slain & Kripke, supra note 234, at 263–65 (citations omitted).
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public that all assets are gone due to hacking. The
principals apologize for less than ideal safety procedures.
One month later, XYZ corporation files for bankruptcy.
In this proceeding, H asserts a claim for rescission of his
$2.8 million stock purchase, alleging that the issuer
violated § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (to bring the
action within the scope of the securities laws). That claim is
subordinated.
Simultaneously, I and J assert claims for damages due to
negligence. I and J would seem to have a severable claim,
because (per Khan) the claims were due to the unforeseen
theft by other individuals.
XYZ’s trustee in bankruptcy attempts to show that the issue
was exempted as a nonpublic offering under § 4(2) of the
Act, but fails when he is unable to demonstrate that all the
persons to whom the $5 million in coins had been offered
were sophisticated. It is probable that H has a claim to
share pari passu with the claims of general creditors.
Yet, I and J would seem to make plausible arguments that
their claims are on par with creditors, due to the rational
reading of the timeline of the case.
As Khan educates, “[T]here is a limit to the reach of § 510(b), which
stops short of encompassing every transaction that touches on or
involves stock in a corporation.”275

275. Khan v. Barton (In re Khan), 846 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2017).
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CONCLUSION: TIME FOR A NEW NORMAL?
A. A Pointed Summary
The current application of the absolute priority rule to investor
claims is premised on a study that is over fifty years old.276 Although
the Kripke–Slain Hypothesis is laudable, it is in need of updating for
unconventional online investments. Simply put, those two
outstanding scholars produced an interpretation of § 510(b) at a time
when the thorniest investor–issuer disputes centered on varying share
classes and interlocking partnership agreements. Today’s issues
question: (1) the very existence of a security; (2) the point at which
issuer wrongdoing (if any) transpired; (3) the ability of the
bankruptcy estate to locate the funds being fought over; (4) whether
there is a ceiling on financial assets contributed and gathered online;
and (5) a novel interdependency of regulatory action, criminal
charges, and class action litigation in the absence of timely statutory
changes.277
Further, recent efforts at updating the Code have centered on its
possible abuse by debtors.278 Although such avoidance of judicial and
economical waste is salutary, that focus forestalls or precludes
amendment to § 510(b)—particularly at a time when neither
Congress nor regulators have defined cryptocurrencies and their
latest incarnation, the ICO.
Accordingly, to promulgate a working arrangement for victims of
insolvent crypto-issuers, the present authors have offered the
following syllogism:
1. As evidenced by over seventy years of successful
276. Slain & Kripke, supra note 234, at 298–99.
277. See In re Khan, 846 F.3d at 1064; Zack Christensen, The FAIR Funds for Investors Provision of
Sarbanes-Oxley: Is It Unfair to the Creditors of a Bankrupt Debtor?, 71 U. ILL. L. REV 339, 339 (2005);
Colesanti, supra note 27, at 30; Hester Peirce, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Regulation: A View
from Inside the Machine at University of Missouri School of Law (Feb. 6, 2019).
278. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119
Stat 23, 59, 75.
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application, the Howey test broadly expands the
securities laws to reach a great many (often unexpected)
financial arrangements.
2. As evidenced by noteworthy actions by the chief
securities markets regulator, ICOs, since late 2017, are
often presumed securities.
3. As evidenced by the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, securities
holders are subordinated to both secured and unsecured
creditors.
4. As evidenced by several decisions since 2017, a
severable claim may be brought by the securities holder.
5. Further, the Ninth Circuit has held that where the
conversion is severable from the investment, an investor
claim can overcome subordination.
6. ICOs—when they have been disciplined by the SEC—
have been found to have commenced lawfully and later
defrauded investor–depositors.
7. Thus, a valid argument can be made for allowing the
ICO purchaser to elevate his severable claim to pari
passu status with creditors.
Such a progression is more than just plausible; sharing the wealth
appears the most equitable distribution of remaining estate proceeds
given the uncertainties of ICOs that continue to puzzle market
regulators.279 The biggest obstacle to a reorientation of the Kripke–
Slain Hypothesis is the Hypothesis itself.
B. Final Thoughts
As a reminder, both the number of investor–depositors and the
volume of their ICO contributions are staggering figures.280

279. Compare Clayton Statement, supra note 100 with Peirce, supra note 277 (opining that Howey is
not a good fit for many ICO deals).
280. See supra Section II.B.2.
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Consequentially, regulators are racing to inform the public of the
attendant risk of loss.281
To be sure, the elevation of claim advocated herein would create
some new obstacles. For example, creditors would find themselves
sharing a depleted trust with investor–purchasers who might already
be better off financially. However, in the complicated world of
recovery for securities fraud, creditors already face such competition.
As far back as 2005, it was noted that SEC “FAIR Funds,” a creation
of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002,282 prioritize recovered funds for
defrauded investors.283

281. See, e.g., Initial Coin Offerings, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/investors/learn-to-invest/typesinvestments/initial-coin-offerings-and-cryptocurrencies/initial-coin-offerings [https://perma.cc/Y5NV4S45] (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
282. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
283. See Christensen, supra note 277. As Mr. Christensen argued:
[T]he SEC and common stockholders may work an end-run around section 510(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code and elevate the stockholders’ claims by resorting to the Fair
Funds for Investors provision. Further, as corporate malfeasance increases public
outrage, the SEC will face increasing pressure to divert funds to defrauded investors,
leaving creditors to collect from a depleted bankruptcy estate.
Id.
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